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of Participatory Political Parties in  
Croatia 
 
Dražen Cepić and Marko Kovačić 
 
 
This paper debates the crisis of democracy and the importance of civil 
society in bringing forth new, participatory models of democracy. This is 
demonstrated in the case of Croatia following the results of the local 
elections in the spring of 2013 when five newly founded political parties, 
which shared strong ties to civil society, saw success. Building on the 
existing literature on the crisis of democracy, the authors argue that the 
low level of trust in political parties is not sufficient for explaining this 
phenomenon. Seeking to provide a more comprehensive solution, the 
authors introduce the factor of motivation by analysing the failures of 
CSOs in establishing a dialogue with the government, as well as the 
structural features of CSOs, thereby establishing a link between the 
macro and micro level of analysis. The paper indicates similarities with 
other post-socialist countries, allowing for speculation about possible 
similarities between them. 
 
Keywords: participatory democracy, crisis of democracy, civil society, 
political parties, post-socialism 
 
 
Introduction 
In the last local elections in Croatia in May 2013, several recently founded 
political initiatives caused an upset, winning a significant number of seats in 
their respective municipalities and outperforming candidates from the 
mainstream political parties. Despite origins in different parts of the country, 
several of these more or less newly established parties share a number of 
common traits. In addition to similarities in their names – ‘For the City’(Za 
grad), ‘For Rijeka’ (Za Rijeku), ‘For Smart People and a Smart City’ (Za 
pametne ljude i pametni grad), ‘Civic Option of the City of Osijek’ (Građanska 
opcija grada Osijeka), ‘Srđ is Ours’ (Srđ je naš) - they also predominantly share 
origins in the civil sector and grassroots movements. They place an emphasis 
                                                          
* Dražen Cepić is a research fellow at the International Development Department, University of 
Birmingham. He received his PhD in social and political sciences from the European University 
Institute in Florence in 2013. Before joining the University of Birmingham, he was a research 
fellow at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford and the New 
Europe College-Institute for Advanced Study in Bucharest.   
Marko Kovačić works as a researcher at the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb. He is a PhD 
candidate in public policy at the University of Ljubljana. He holds an MA in Public Policy from the 
University of Zagreb and an MA in Political Science from Central European University.    
The authors wish to thank all interviewees who helped us to understand their political parties 
better. We thank them for their time and patience. In addition, we owe a debt of gratitude to two 
anonymous reviewers whose comments helped us to shape this paper into a coherent and 
analytically sound unit. 
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on the model of participatory democracy, show a regional orientation and 
liberal social values and transgress the traditional left-right divide. In this 
paper, we will search for the conditions that led to their emergence, which 
resulted in the proliferation of participatory democratic parties in Croatian 
politics.  
 
The crisis of democracy has surely been one of the most explored areas in the 
field of social and political sciences for decades. A whole array of political 
scientists has gone on to explore the loss of legitimacy and faith in democratic 
institutions that have taken place since the 1960s. This is the period 
characterized by the withdrawal of the welfare state, the emergence of new 
social movements and economic crises, all of which followed the unprecedented 
interval of the post-WWII economic growth. However, for the post-socialist 
context of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and Croatian politics 
specifically, parliamentary democracy established after the decline of state-
socialism faced additional difficulties. The long transformation of the political 
system from socialism to democracy and the lack of democratic culture1 – an 
umbrella term referring to a whole series of phenomena that together resulted 
in unresponsive democratically elected authorities – have made the democratic 
functioning of political institutions incomparably more problematic than in 
most countries in Western Europe.2 In such conditions, the emergence of new 
political actors might seem a natural progression. Where, if not here, would you 
expect a rise of new political initiatives advocating for a higher level of political 
participation?  
 
All of these factors created an opportunity for new political parties promoting 
civic participation to emerge. In this paper, we will describe this trend by 
presenting five political initiatives that emerged in five different cities: Zagreb, 
the state capital, Dubrovnik, Split, Rijeka and Osijek, with the last three being 
the largest cities after Zagreb. The crisis of democracy, however, did not 
automatically lead to the above-mentioned trend. In our analysis, we point out 
additional variables that set the wheels in motion, demonstrating why this 
empty space in Croatian politics has been filled by the given actors, and why 
Croatian civil society organizations (CSOs) presented an ideal candidate for 
this quite unusual role. By defining the external circumstances (a high degree 
of public support for the civil society, disappointment of the CSOs with the 
possibilities to cooperate with the authorities) and the internal characteristics 
of the CSOs (proactivity, adaptability and mobilization) that allowed them to 
quickly adjust to the political game, we make an important contribution to the 
debate on “the crisis of democracy”. At the same time, given its area 
perspective, this paper contributes to scholarship on civil society in the CEE 
and research on politics in post-socialist societies in general.  
                                                          
1 Almond, Gabriel A. and Sydney. Verba. 1963. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. 
Boston: Little, Brown & Company. 
2 Arato, Andrew. 1996. Civil Society, Transition and Consolidation of Democracy. Paper at the 
International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe: 
Rupture and Continuity. Paris, 4-6 March 1996. (accessed: 11. February 2015); McAllister, Ian and 
Stephen White. 2007. Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Communist Societies. 
Party Politics 13(197), 197-216; Merkel, Wolfgang. 2008. Plausible theory, unexpected results: the 
rapid democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe. International Politics and Society 2, 
11-29. 
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The data from which we drew our conclusions were acquired through several 
qualitative methodological techniques. The newly established parties were 
analysed through a textual analysis of their statutes, programmes and 
websites. Moreover, given that desk research can provide little insight into 
party organizations, the motivation of actors and programme development, 
data were also gathered using participatory observation. The authors of the 
article were active in the core team of one of the parties for the entire duration 
of the campaign for the May elections, during which time they participated in 
party meetings and took part in various party activities. In order to understand 
the motivation of actors and the organising principles of other parties, they also 
conducted interviews with representatives of other parties, either during live 
meetings or via email communication (the interviews were held in the period 
between July 2013 and September 2013). The respondents were asked to 
describe the circumstances under which they decided to switch from the civil 
sector to the political arena, and also about the aspect of participatory 
democracy in their decision-making patterns. A series of open-ended questions 
depended on the respective interviewees and included questions such as: Please 
describe the circumstances under which your party was created. What were the 
motives for establishing a political party? How many founding members had 
previous experience in civil society? Please specify in which CSOs they 
participated. What is the main objective of your party? Please describe the 
decision-making process in your party.  
 
Can we assume that our findings from the Croatian case can be generalized to 
other countries of the region (post-Yugoslav region, region of Southeastern 
Europe, the post-socialist region) or even broader? On one hand, the results 
seem strictly related to the specific circumstances and events of recent history 
that shaped Croatian society into what it is today. Ideally, several other 
country cases would be included in the research. This would allow us to draw 
stronger conclusions about tendencies in participatory democracies in different 
contexts, as well as about the strength and potential of civil society3 to cure the 
ills of contemporary, representative democracies in environments that differ 
from Croatia. However, the methodological approach of this study rendered 
this almost impossible; methodology resting on in-depth interviews and 
ethnographic research necessarily limited the number of cases. On the other 
hand, in this paper we demonstrate the advantages of a case-oriented 
approach, which is both historically interpretative and causally analytic.4 This 
allowed us to consider our case as a distinct entity and to explore it as a 
configuration of characteristics, not merely as a collection of variables.  
 
The argument will be divided into three parts. In the first section, we will 
briefly look at the authors and literature that discuss the participatory 
                                                          
3 For a better conceptualization of civil society see Diamond’s text (1994) on the concept of civil 
society, Kaldor, Mary. 2003. Global Civil Society. An Answer to War. Cambridge: Polity for 
functions of civil society and Schmitter, Philippe C. 1997. Civil Society: East and West, in 
Consolidating Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives, edited by Diamond, Larry / 
Plattner Marc / Chu, Yunhan and Hung-mao, Tien. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
239-62 for the difference between civil society in the East and the West. 
4 Ragin, Charles C. 1987. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative 
Strategies. Berkley: University of California Press, 35. 
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solutions for the crisis of democracy. After providing the theoretical framework 
of our study, we will move on to the empirical part of the research. We will 
establish the object of analysis by presenting new political initiatives and their 
ways of transcending problems of parliamentary democracy, which are 
explained in the second section. Finally, before providing our concluding 
remarks, we will analyse the broader social and political conditions that led to 
this development.  
 
 
1. The Crisis of Democracy and Participatory Politics 
The crisis of democracy has for decades been one of the most explored areas in 
the field of social and political sciences.5 A whole array of social scientists has 
sought to explore the loss of legitimacy and faith in democratic institutions, 
trying to explain the failure of democratic systems to deliver “government of 
the people, by the people, for the people.” Due to the fact that democratically 
elected governments have gradually ceased to represent citizens’ interests, it 
has been said that the degree of trust in democratic systems has been 
diminished on a grand scale.6 The democratic systems based on political 
representation discussed here deviate from the original model of democracy, 
instead focusing more on normative acts, institutions and procedures that may 
not always be in correspondence with the needs and will of the people. At the 
same time, the state of democracy seems almost indistinguishable from the 
state of political parties, which are the main actors in the democratic political 
arena.  
 
As described in some of the classic studies of political science, most notably by 
Lipset and Rokkan and Sartori,7 political parties are said to have two main 
roles: expressive - representation of different social groups, expressing the 
demands of their members and supporters, - and instrumental - as channels for 
communication. In contemporary politics, however, as numerous authors have 
noticed, both functions seem highly problematic. Nowadays, political parties 
are, as the argument goes, more concerned with obtaining votes and mandates, 
as well as figuring out the means of achieving these goals. Therefore, they are 
often promising what people want to hear regardless of their ideology and point 
of view. As a result of the decrease in the representative function of parties, the 
aggregation and articulation of interests and their delivery to the political 
system are becoming ever weaker.8  
 
                                                          
5 Instead of the word ‘decades,’ one might as well choose ‘centuries,’ as the critique of modern 
representative democracy has been a topic in numerous classical philosophical accounts, from 
Rousseau and Marx to Max Weber and Schumpeter (see Bobbio, Norberto. 2005. Liberalism and 
democracy. London: Verso and Held, David. 2006. Models of democracy. Cambridge: Polity). 
However, in this account we focused primarily on the contemporary critiques. 
6 Katz, Richard S. and Peter. Mair. 1995. Changing Models of Party Organization and Party 
Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party. Party politics 1(1), 5-28; Mair, Peter. 2006. Party 
System Change, in Handbook of Party Politics, edited by Katz, Richard S. and William J Crotty. 
London: Sage, 63-74. 
7 Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan (eds.). 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-
national perspectives. New York: Free Press; Sartori, Giovanni. 2005. Party types, organisation and 
functions. West European Politics 28(1), 5-32. 
8 Ravlić, Slaven. 2007. Transformacija predstavničke funkcije političkih stranaka. Zbornik Pravnog 
fakulteta u Zagrebu 57(6), 979-1004. 
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Numerous accounts in contemporary social science have dealt with one of the 
crucial issues of contemporary democracy: how to “rule in common for the 
common [in a just and democratic way].”9 The conventional definitions of 
democracy, which restrict it to the mere electoral process, are in this view 
simply too narrow. According to Pierre Rosanvallon, there is a need for “a more 
adequate account [that] would include the various ways in which the people are 
able to check or hold to account their representatives or the government, 
irrespective of the electoral process.”10 How can this be achieved? In 
Rosanvallon’s theory of counter-democracy, there is only one solution to bring 
back the trust in political institutions and improve the quality of democracy - 
active citizenry where individuals demand more power in the decision-making 
process. Oversight, prevention and judgment11 are necessary to utilize 
democracy to its fullest potential, whereas political parties should return to 
their fundamentals - interest aggregation and the articulation and delivery of 
citizens’ demands into a political system.12 If those features were adopted, the 
argument goes, the political systems would be more responsive and the 
democratic deficit would decrease. 
 
Attempts to face the ills of liberal democracies, by emphasizing the return to a 
representational function and stressing a more intensive communication with 
citizens, represent one of the most interesting theoretical issues in the 
contemporary theory of democracy. However, if “citizen participation is both 
the heart of democracy and a mandatory part of many public decisions,”13 and 
if individual freedom and personal development can only be achieved by the 
permanent and direct inclusion of citizens into a policymaking process,14 then 
the question emerges, how can this be achieved? Who are the political actors 
ready to take over the assigned role? Finally, which mechanisms should the 
participatory democratic parties, which demand deliberation, discussion, 
higher citizen participation and involvement in the policy-making process, 
implement to achieve these goals? These questions remained insufficiently 
elaborated in the empirical (rather than normative) literature on participatory 
democracy, whereas the analysis of this aspect represents the main theoretical 
contribution of this paper.  
                                                          
9 Brown, Wendy. 2011. We Are All Democrats Now..., in Democracy in What State?, edited by 
Agamben, Giorgio et al. New York: Columbia University Press, 44-57. 
10 Rosanvallon, Pierre. 2008. Counter-democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust. Cambridge 
University Press. 
11 The first refers to the various means whereby citizens (or, more accurately, organizations of 
citizens) are able to monitor and publicize the behaviour of elected and appointed rulers; the second 
refers to their capacity to mobilize resistance to specific policies, either before or after they have 
been selected; the third refers to the trend toward the ‘juridification’ of politics when individuals or 
social groups use the courts and especially jury trials to bring delinquent politicians to justice 
(Rosanvallon, Counter-democracy). 
12 This conception is also close to the idea of council democracy, which can be found in texts by 
Hannah Arendt, Thomas Jefferson and F.W. Maitland. Council democracy is practiced on the local 
level with the goal of enhancing community welfare. Instead of representatives being put forward 
by those in power, managed by party organizations and excluding people at large from the exercise 
of power, council democracy is conceptualized as a form of government where people meet in their 
local communities, discuss local problems and some among them are chosen to participate in 
assemblies higher up. Compare Mosley, Ivo. 2013. ´Council democracy' - reform must begin with the 
local.’ (accessed: 11. February 2015). 
13 Gastil, John and Peter Levine. 2005. The deliberative democracy handbook: Strategies for 
effective civic engagement in the twenty-first century. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
14 Held, Models of democracy, 263. 
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In the following sections, we will analyse the ‘deliberative movement’ among 
political parties by providing in-depth insight in the cases of participatory 
democratic parties. However, instead of quantitative cross-country research, we 
concentrate on the single country-case of Croatia, with a special focus on the 
‘new wave’ of recently established political initiatives, which achieved success 
in the last local elections held in May 2013. What is the logic behind this case 
selection? Even though the crisis of democracy represents a global 
phenomenon, which can and should be studied in a large N, in this paper we 
follow the argument put forth by Schmitter and Karl15 and Linz and Stephan.16 
According to them, the legitimacy of democratic institutions should be studied 
as entrenched within contextually specific socioeconomic conditions, state 
structures and policy practices. The post-socialist context of Croatia represents 
the political setting and local institutional tradition in which we observe the 
object of our study. Our goals will, therefore, be twofold. On the one hand, we 
seek to explain a local phenomenon by elucidating the deeper historical 
conditions that led to its emergence. At the same time, however, we believe 
that this local perspective can represent an important contribution to the 
examination of ‘the participatory turn’ among political parties as part of the 
global process.  
 
 
2. The Participatory Turn in Croatian Party Politics  
The descending tendency of the degree of trust in democratic institutions that 
was primarily established in the societies and politics of the advanced, Western 
capitalist countries proved even more problematic in the post-socialist context 
of Central and Eastern Europe. High levels of political corruption, devastation 
to social capital during decades of authoritarian regimes, and political elites 
broadly found to be unaccountable for their respective constituencies all 
created conditions in which the crisis of democratic legitimacy was even more 
noticeable than in their western counterparts.17 Recently, however, a new 
political trend has emerged in Croatian politics that has demonstrated the 
important healing potential for an otherwise seriously damaged health of 
representative democracy. Even though they are formally unrelated and 
                                                          
15 Schmitter, Phillip C. and Terry L. Karl. 1991. What democracy is... and is not. Journal of 
democracy 2(3), 75-88. 
16 Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. 2011. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Cambridge: JHU Press. 
17 Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1990. Reflections on the Revolution in Europe. New York: Times Books; 
Markowski, Radoslaw. 1997. Political parties and ideological spaces in East Central Europe. 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 30(3), 221-54; Limongi, Fernando and Adam Przeworski. 
1997. Modernization: Theories and facts. World politics 49(2), 155-83; Lijphart, Arend. 1999. 
Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. New Haven, 
CT/London: Yale University Press; Kitschelt, Herbert. (ed.). 1999. Post-communist party systems: 
competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
Dimitrova, Antoaneta and Geoffrey Pridham. 2004. International actors and democracy promotion 
in Central and Eastern Europe: the integration model and its limits. Democratization, 11(5), 91-112; Šalaj, Berto. 2007. Socijalni capital. Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti; Merkel, Plausible 
theory, 11-29; Merkel, Wolfgang. 2009. Transformacija političkih sustava. Teorije i analize. Zagreb: 
Fakultet političkih znanosti; Roberts, Andrew. 2010. The quality of democracy in Eastern Europe: 
public preferences and policy reforms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Bohle, Dorothee 
and Béla Greskovits. 2012. Capitalist diversity on Europe's periphery. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
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emerged independently of each other, the five parties were frequently perceived 
as being part of the same trend and sharing a similar political agenda. In this 
section, we will present the five cases (the data gathered from the party 
programmes and websites are complemented by the information given in the 
interviews by the party representatives) and will conclude the section by 
analysing ‘family resemblances’ between them. 
 
 
2.1 For the City / Zagreb 
The political party ‘For the City’ is a regional party that was founded in March 
2013 in Zagreb by a group of young university graduates, most of whom 
pursued postgraduate degrees abroad. Even though the party developed from 
the Zagreb-based CSO ‘The Cyclists’ Union’, which was directed at improving 
Zagreb’s cycling infrastructure, it soon broadened its scope of interests and 
embraced a more general, green ideological platform. In the campaign for the 
May elections, the emphasis was put on three main topics: the implementation 
of sustainable transport solutions, the promotion of environmental topics and 
the propagation of participatory democracy. In the local elections for the City 
Assembly in May 2013, the party won almost 4% of the votes. Despite not 
managing to cross the 5% threshold, the party won the sixth highest number of 
votes; at the elections for the 17 city borough councils, it won 13 seats.18 After 
the new local government was established, the party continued to promote 
citizens’ participation in the decision-making processes. In addition to the web 
platform, where citizens of Zagreb could write their proposals for improvements 
in living conditions in Zagreb, the party representatives of the respective 
counties opened Facebook groups and established blogs to enhance their 
everyday communication with citizens.  
 
 
2.2 For Smart People and a Smart City / Split 
The political initiative ‘For Smart People and a Smart City’ caused the biggest 
upset in the May local elections, winning 12% of votes for City Council. 
Marijana Puljak, head of the initiative, became involved in politics before the 
previous local elections when, together with her neighbours, she started 
lobbying for the construction of a public elementary school, which in their 
opinion the neighbourhood lacked. After a disappointing experience of 
communicating with the city authorities, Puljak, an IT engineer who worked in 
a bank, decided to run for a position in the council of the city borough of Žnjan, 
where she was elected in 2008. Encouraged by her success on the city borough 
level, Puljak and her collaborators decided to run in the 2013 elections with a 
programme based on the ‘Smart City’ platform, which has been implemented in 
a number of cities around the world. Puljak’s political initiative avoided topics 
                                                          
18The basic units of local government in Croatia are municipalities and towns that belong to 21 
counties (administrative units and their assemblies, which have legislative power; zupanije). 
Zagreb, the capital, has a special status and represents a territorial and administrative whole, 
enjoying the status of a county. Lower municipal level units (gradske četvrti) are actually boroughs 
(each has its assembly), which are further divided into local councils (mjesni odbori). While Zagreb 
and Split have this system, smaller cities and municipalities do not have the middle level of local 
government. In Rijeka, Osijek and Dubrovnik, urban local councils are called city boroughs, while 
suburban and rural local councils are called local councils. See more in: Kregar, Josip / Đulabić, 
Vedran / Gardašević, Đorđe / Musa, Anamarija / Ravlić, Slaven and Tereza Rogić Lugarić. 2011. 
Decentralizacija. Zagreb: Centar za demokraciju i pravo Miko Tripalo.  
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of national importance in the campaign for the May elections, primarily 
emphasizing local topics and advocating for citizen participation. The political 
programme included various mechanisms for the enhancement of participatory 
democracy: the introduction of citizen participation in the decision-making 
processes through public discussions and workshops, permanent and 
transparent communication with citizens via contact centres, as well as SMS 
and email referenda, and the use of a pre-existing web platform where citizens 
can send proposals that are then forwarded to the county governing bodies.  
 
 
2.3 For Rijeka / Rijeka 
The political party ‘For Rijeka’ was founded in 2006 as a regional political party 
whose representatives have been selected for the City Council for two 
consecutive terms, in 2008 and 2013. As in the previous two cases, it emerged 
from the CSO ‘Free State of Rijeka’. Frustrated by the inertia and 
incompetence of the local political parties, its members decided to become 
politically active with three main political objectives: decentralization, with an 
emphasis on the fiscal independence of the city of Rijeka, re-industrialization, 
with the port of Rijeka having a central role in this process, and the promotion 
of liberal social values (secularism and multiculturalism, as opposed to 
Croatian nationalism). Participatory democracy is present primarily through 
the empowerment of the local authorities by fostering a ‘council democracy’ and 
including citizens in the decision-making process. 
 
 
2.4 Osijek Civic Option / Osijek 
In the May elections, ‘Osijek Civic Option’ passed the 5% threshold and won 
two seats in the City Council. Unlike other political initiatives discussed in this 
context, the leading officials of the ‘Osijek Civic Option’ had prior experience in 
mainstream political parties, but after several disappointments with this 
experience, they decided to form a new political initiative. Most of the 
members, however, have little political experience and are instead 
professionals, entrepreneurs employed in the private sector and former civil 
society activists. Besides advocating for transparency values, a more efficient 
city administration and the development of entrepreneurial policies, ‘Osijek 
Civic Option’ put a substantial emphasis on stronger participation of the 
citizens in decision-making processes. It did this through cooperation with local 
CSOs and various forms of e-referenda (for instance, SMS referendum) on the 
level of city boroughs.  
 
 
2.5 Srđ is Ours / Dubrovnik 
‘Srđ is Ours’ was founded in Dubrovnik a few months before the May elections. 
This was a direct consequence of the failure of the CSO of the same name in 
preventing the development of a tourist resort on the nearby Srđ hill, which 
civil activists from Dubrovnik saw as a major environmental threat. The 
tourist resort, which includes hotels, apartment houses and golf courses, had 
been controversial since its official presentation almost 10 years ago. The 
controversy stemmed from the environmental risks related to the development 
of golf courses, the dangers of the ‘Spanish model’ of development of tourist 
infrastructure (the so-called ‘betonization’ and apartmanization of the coast) 
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and most of all, the non-transparent procedure through which the project was 
permitted by the city authorities. In this sense, ‘Srđ is Ours’ clearly 
demonstrates the specific pathway through which CSOs divert their activities 
towards formal politics and political engagement; they do so by competing with 
the very same political structures that were the direct cause of their political 
involvement, through their unresponsiveness and lack of accountability  
 
 
In spite of the independent origins of the five political initiatives described in 
the previous sections – the interviews with representatives of the parties 
revealed that all parties grew independently of one another, without the 
interference of organizational learning from other contexts – the newly 
established parties share a number of common traits (Table 1). One of the most 
instantly recognizable shared traits of the political initiatives is the similarity 
in the official names of their organizations. The names are syntagmatically 
structured in an atypical manner different from other major political parties – 
names of most political parties in Croatia consist of three components, 
containing the attribute ‘Croatian,’ the noun ‘party’ and a third clause 
representing differentia specifica, e.g. the ‘Croatian People’s Party’ (Hrvatska 
narodna stranka, HNS), the ‘Croatian Peasants’ Party’ (Hrvatska seljačka 
stranka, HSS). They even differ from the names of mainstream political parties 
on a semantic level, evoking an activist spirit and a new mode of political 
subjectivity (‘For...’ or ‘...is ours’). In this section, however, it has been shown 
that the similarities between the initiatives transcend the mere formal level, 
indicating a deeper analogy in the content of their political activity.  
 
Table 1: Shared Characteristics of the Five Parties 
 
 
For the 
City 
For Smart 
People and 
a Smart 
City 
For Rijeka 
Osijek 
Civic 
Initiative 
Srđ is 
Ours 
Civil Society 
Background 
++ ++ ++ + ++ 
Participatory 
Democracy 
++ + + + ++ 
E-communication ++ ++ + + + 
Regionalization / 
Decentralization 
+ + ++ + + 
Liberal Social 
Values 
++ + ++ + ++ 
Source: Authors’ own illustration 
 
In a political context characterized by a low degree of trust in politics and a 
high degree of contempt towards the political parties, emphasizing distance 
from the mainstream political parties is surely unsurprising. However, an in-
depth analysis of the political parties, which constitutes the subject of this 
analysis, indicates that all of the new parties have, to varying degrees, origins 
in the organizations of civil society and very little experience in the frames of 
formal politics. This, to move over to the second point, has led them to start 
including practices typical for CSOs – horizontal, instead of vertical, decision 
making processes and an emphasis on the values of participatory politics.  
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The ‘broadening of civic participation’ in representative democracy has become 
a widespread catch phrase even among mainstream political parties. Yet, the 
concrete mechanisms allowing citizens to take part in the decision making 
processes distinguish the political initiatives we decided to include in the 
‘participatory democratic’ camp from the merely rhetorical usage of the 
concepts related to participatory democracy. Some of these mechanisms 
include: e-referenda, SMS-voting, web platforms enabling the direct 
participation of citizens in creating party programmes, proposals for 
decentralization and bringing decision making processes to a lower level of 
political participation. When looking at these parties, the use of all resources 
that are available for effective communication with citizens is key in 
transforming a passive mass of voters into involved and informed stakeholders.  
 
As successful civic activists, who are responsible for mobilizing thousands of 
citizens to achieve their objectives, the leaders of the five political parties put 
great emphasis on their new modes of communication. In the context in which 
they were about to compete for the elections, with financial and human 
resources almost incomparably lower than for the major political parties, 
communication via Facebook, Twitter and other forms of social media, as well 
as viral marketing in general, proved critical for their campaigns. Besides 
these communication channels, the programmes of all five parties put strong 
emphasis on the need for regionalization and decentralization. This was due to 
three factors: the excessive level of centralization of state administration in 
Croatia, the values of participatory democracy and the fact that all five 
initiatives emerged on a local level, and have so far competed solely in local 
elections.  
 
The content of their programmes represents a final point of convergence. All of 
the political initiatives analysed in this paper share similar values regarding 
human and civil rights, the protection of minorities (ethnic, racial and sexual) 
and the principles of secularism– what we, somewhat inaptly, called “liberal 
social values.”19  Instead of alluding to the ideology of individualism in the 
economic sense, we referred to liberalism as a social doctrine that advocates for 
the need to emancipate individuals from authoritarian regimes, as well as 
secular freedoms that enable citizens to resist rigid dogmas of religious 
communities, which after 1990 gathered significant influence in the political 
spheres in several CEE countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 It could be argued that, given that the equality before the law, right to non-discrimination and 
the separation of Church and State are guaranteed by the very constitution, promoting these 
values merely amounts to stating the obvious. However, these attitudes should be understood in 
the context of recent social and political changes in Croatia, which were strongly influenced by, as 
some commentators called it, a ‘conservative revolution’ and intense activities of the Catholic 
Church and Church-related organizations. The referendum held in December 2013, which approved changes to Croatia’s constitution in defining marriage as a union between a man and a 
woman, is taken as one of their most significant successes. This development can serve as a 
reminder that secularization is a process that includes a diminishing public and political 
importance of religious communities, rather than a unique constitutional arrangement.  
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3. Civil Society and New Party Development 
In the previous section, we have pointed out a new trend that has emerged in 
Croatian party politics. Our analysis demonstrated several traits that these 
parties held in common. In the following paragraphs, we turn to the question of 
how to explain the polycentric development that emerged in a similar period in 
five different settings in Croatia. What are the circumstances and historical 
assumptions of the Croatian political arena that have led to this phenomenon? 
Finally, after more than 20 years of democracy and multiple party elections, 
what made this moment in time suitable for such a development? We start the 
analysis by discussing different hypotheses that provide answers to these 
questions.  
 
 
3.1 Trust and Mistrust: Civil Society vs. Political Parties 
The crisis of democracy represents an obvious hypothesis for the question of 
why the political situation resulted in the emergence of participatory 
democratic parties. Diminishing trust in political institutions, the ideological 
dislodging of traditional political parties, and a general impression that 
institutions of democratic representation no longer manage to stand for 
citizens’ needs and wishes seemingly turned political parties in the direction of 
higher democratic persuasiveness. There is an abundance of evidence 
demonstrating that mainstream political parties, while focused on winning 
elections by using empty rhetoric, failed to aggregate the interests of citizens 
and represent their will in the political arena. As seen from Table 2, the 
percentage of citizens tending not to trust any political party in Croatia has 
exceeded 90% since 2009.  
 
Table 2: Trust in Political Parties in Croatia 
 
Date 
Tend not to 
trust 
Tend to 
trust 
Don't know 
10/2004 86% 7% 7% 
06/2005 84% 11% 6% 
10/2005 85% 8% 7% 
04/2006 84% 11% 5% 
09/2006 88% 7% 5% 
10/2007 86% 8% 6% 
04/2008 88% 9% 3% 
10/2008 86% 10% 4% 
06/2009 91% 7% 2% 
11/2009 92% 4% 4% 
06/2010 88% 8% 4% 
11/2011 90% 6% 4% 
05/2012 86% 12% 2% 
11/2012 89% 7% 4% 
05/2013 90% 9% 1% 
Source: Eurostat, 2013.  
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As we argue in this paper, a space opened for some new actors to jump in and 
take a slice of the political cake as a result of dissatisfaction with the 
mainstream parties, their unresponsiveness and the high level of political 
corruption. However, despite achieving record-low levels of trust in political 
parties in May 2013, the crisis of democracy in Croatia is hardly a recent 
phenomenon, with figures holding well above 80% at least since 2004.20 Even if 
the crisis of democracy provided good conditions for the emergence of new 
political parties, this factor alone cannot explain the rise of participatory 
democratic parties in recent years.  
 
A high level of trust in the CSOs provides an alternative explanation (still not 
incompatible with the previously presented argument). Given the origins of the 
new participatory democratic political parties in the civil society, it is 
reasonable to assume the connection between the two factors. Indeed, while the 
mainstream political parties suffered from the decreasing levels of trust, recent 
trends show rising levels of trust in the CSOs. The high EU-fund absorption 
capacities of CSOs,21 employment growth of 13.3% within the civil sector22 and 
the CSOs’ activities, which are open for wide participation of citizens, have 
resulted in positive attitudes within society. Research on the support for CSOs 
in Croatia (Table 3.) suggests that almost three quarters of the population have 
a positive or very positive attitude - especially among the younger generation, 
employed citizens and the urban population.23 Furthermore, support rose more 
than 5% from 2007 to 2012 (a substantial growth even with the margin of error 
of around 3%). However, the increase in support has been to some extent 
cancelled out by the 1% increase in negative attitudes.  
 
Table 3: Support for Civil Society Organizations 2007-2012 
  2007 2012 
CSO work is very beneficiary for a society 33% 38,3% 
CSO work is somewhat beneficiary for a society 38,5% 37,4% 
CSOs are neither harmful, nor beneficiary for a society 25,7% 21,5 
CSO work is harmful for a society 0,7% 1,6% 
CSO work is very harmful for a society 0,2% 1% 
No answer 1,9% 0,3% 
N 1000 1004 
Source: Franc, Renata / Sučić, Ines / Međugorac, Vanja and Stanko Rihtar. 2012. Vidljivost i javna 
percepcija udruga u Hrvatskoj 2012. Zagreb: TACSO. 
                                                          
20 Even though there are no sound empirical data on the trust in parties before 2004, there are 
some indicators that this trend is from an even earlier date, as for instance in Rimac, Ivan. 2000. 
Neke determinante povjerenja u institucije političkog sustava u Hrvatskoj. Bogoslovska smotra 
70(2), 471-84. 
21 Ured za udruge Vlade RH. 2010. Izvješće s dana udruga. (accessed: 11. February 2015). 
22 Ponoš, Tihomir. 2012. Bijeg s burze: Udruge u godinu dana zaposlile oko tisuću ljudi. Novi list. 
09. August 2012. (accessed: 11. February 2015). 
23 Franc, Renata / Sučić, Ines / Međugorac, Vanja and Stanko Rihtar. 2012. Vidljivost i javna 
percepcija udruga u Hrvatskoj 2012. Zagreb: TACSO, 31. 
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However, even if this sheds more light on the space created for the emergence 
of new participatory democratic parties, it still does not explain the 
mechanisms of the newly emerging trend. What was the actual motivation of 
the actors in switching from civil society to formal politics? How can we 
construct a macro-micro link when interpreting this phenomenon? In order to 
explain this, as we demonstrate in the following section, it is necessary to take 
into account the dynamics of the cooperation between civil society and political 
authorities and the resulting disappointment of the activists. This can be 
demonstrated through the case of the civic initiative ‘Right to the City’. 
 
 
3.2 Right to the City (2005-2010): Failures and Lessons Learned 
‘Right to the City’ (RTC) was created in 2005 by various Zagreb-based 
organizations dealing with non-institutional culture, environmental issues and 
the youth. As described by Teodor Celakoski, one of the leaders, “RTC is an 
initiative aimed against the management of space that goes against public 
interest and excludes citizens from the decision making process in planning the 
urban development in Zagreb.”24 This initiative, together with the CSO ‘Green 
Action,’ later became the most important actor in one of the biggest organized 
activities of civil society in Croatia – the movement for the preservation of 
Varšavska Street. This street, part of the pedestrian area in the city centre, 
was supposed to be transformed into an access area for the underground 
garage of a private shopping mall after a series of favouring. 
 
A number of activities (protests, petition signing, performances and advocacy 
events) took place between 2006 and 2010, with the climax of these efforts 
occurring in 2010 with a series of protests. The “We won’t give Varšavska 
away!” protest gathered thousands of people in the centre of Zagreb to protest 
against the co-modification of the public space. Civil society activists believed 
that all permits for the intervention in that public space were issued illegally 
and at the harm of citizens of Zagreb. Mass rallies were organized that 
protested the plans to start with the construction. The events culminated in 
May 2010 when the activists tore down security fencing around the 
construction site, just as the work was about to start. For more than two 
months, the activists refused to leave the construction site and held a 24h/day 
vigil, which lasted until special police forces arrested almost 130 activists and 
allowed the construction work to continue. 
 
The failure of the RTC to protect the pedestrian zone and to prevent the 
construction of the shopping mall and the public garage had a profound effect 
on the members of the Croatian CSOs. For if a civic initiative, which enjoyed 
massive public support, had after five years of constant efforts succeeded in 
neither catching the authorities’ attention nor earning a position in the 
decision-making process, then what is the purpose of civic engagement? If the 
most organized and most numerous of initiatives could not win against corrupt 
political elites, could this mean that the idea of civic organization had lost its 
raison d’etre? Finally, what is there left to do, but enter the political arena and 
                                                          
24 Pulska grupa. 2012. Javni prostor mora biti dostupan bez komercijalnih barijera. (accessed: 11. 
February 2015). 
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fight against those elites using their own weapons? Even though the leaders of 
the initiative had not themselves become politically engaged, the RTC served 
as a safe indicator – and a bitter reminder – of the scope of possibilities of civic 
organization in Croatian politics.   
 
Certainly, the deliberate turn in Croatian local politics cannot fully be clarified 
by the history of the RTC. Due to the polycentric development of the five 
parties explored in the paper, an aim to explain their emergence as a direct 
consequence of the events related to RTC would be somewhat misleading. Even if ‘Srđ is Ours’ in Dubrovnik was directly influenced by the RTC activists,25 and 
the members of Zagreb-based ‘For the City’ were actively involved in the events 
organized by the RTC, this had less of an impact in the other three cities. 
Furthermore, the causal sequence appears to be far from unambiguous. 
Although most members of ‘For the City’ participated in the RTC, the party 
was not founded after the failure of the project in 2010 – despite the 
disappointment with political elites. Some activists then founded the ‘Cyclists’ 
Union,’ which was transformed two years later into the political party. As for 
the ‘Smart City’ and ‘For Rijeka’ parties, they were founded a few years before 
the RTC experienced its final failure. However, even if the development of the 
five parties was polycentric, and not the result of one single, causal chain of 
events, the history of the RTC can still be considered as illustrative for the 
pattern through which the CSOs felt motivated to enter the political arena, 
adding a crucial part of the puzzle of the phenomenon under scrutiny.  
 
In the cases of ‘For the City’ and ‘For Rijeka,’ which developed from interest-
based organizations (‘The Cyclists’ Union’ and ‘The Free State of Rijeka’), 
disappointment grew from the fact that despite years of dedicated work, 
structured advocacy strategies, quality analyses and strong popular support – 
similar to the case of the RTC – local governance failed to take these 
organizations as serious policy actors. In the cases of ‘Smart City’ and ‘Srđ is 
Ours,’ which emerged from grassroots movements fighting against a new 
building project that would irreversibly destroy the urban and environmental 
potential of the city (‘Srđ’) and demanding a new elementary school in the 
neighbourhood (‘Smart City’), the interest aggregation was articulated through 
informal civic initiatives, whose members became frustrated by the lack of 
responsiveness of their local governments. However, despite the differences in 
the initial level of institutionalization, all of these parties26 shared one crucial 
factor. They all emerged as a result of the dissatisfaction with civic groups and 
the level of dialogue they led with respective political authorities.  
 
Even though the crisis of trust in political parties opened up space for new 
political actors, and although a high degree of trust in CSOs by itself made 
                                                          
25 When the plans for the building project in Dubrovnik hinterland became visible, Dubrovnik 
activists drew on the experiences and advice from RTC activists in Zagreb, who regularly visited 
Dubrovnik to share their know-how with fellow activists (this was especially facilitated thanks to 
the fact that some of them were born and raised in Dubrovnik and maintained connection to the 
town). 
26 The ‘Osijek Civic Initiative’ stands out from the pattern somewhat, as it was not developed from 
a CSO like the other four parties. However, given that members of the party participated in 
different CSOs and that local authorities in all parts of the country showed a similar lack of 
interest for the contributions of civil society, our hypothesis can still hold. 
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these organizations suitable candidates for filling the void, in the previous 
paragraphs we showed that the disappointment over the failed communication 
with authorities acted as a trigger for the transition from the civic to the 
political sphere. However, what allowed them to transfer to politics with 
success? In the final part of this section, we address this issue by focusing on 
three properties they inherited from their civil society habitus: proactivity, 
adaptability and mobilization. 
 
 
3.3 Proactivity, Adaptability and Mobilization: Civil Society Going Political  
The development of CSOs in Eastern Europe since the 1990s has been a topic 
of much debate among social scientists, many of whose remarks have been 
unambiguously disapproving. Among other things, CSOs in post-socialist 
societies were criticized for their weak mobilization capacities,27 poor 
organizational structures28 and their lack of grassroots organizing potential.29 
The CSOs in Croatia, however, appeared to have avoided these pitfalls and, on 
the contrary, demonstrated a series of successes in setting relevant issues on 
the public and political agendas.  
 
To name only a few examples, ‘GONG’ has played an important role in 
campaigning for fair and free elections since its foundation in 1998. The 
‘Franak’ association won much support through its efforts to protect small 
debtors who were jeopardized by the depreciation of the euro in 2011 (similar 
cases of Swiss franc debtors’ associations can be found in Hungary, Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina). Also, branches of numerous international 
organizations successfully advocated for the rights and interests of various 
social groups (‘Human Rights House,’ ‘Step by Step Foundation,’ ‘Friends of the 
Earth’ and ‘Transparency International’). These achievements helped raise the 
profile of the CSOs in the public sphere, which resulted in increasing levels of 
recognition among the citizens, as demonstrated in the first part of this section. 
The success of such activities on behalf of Croatian CSOs helped build a 
reputation, which quite likely served as important symbolic capital for the 
newly established parties. However, the civil sector background had an 
additional impact on the trajectory of the five parties analysed in this paper.  
 
Proactivity played an important role in gaining the public’s support for the 
newly established parties. The importance of proactive management has been 
addressed as a staple characteristic of CSOs by several authors. The five 
parties continued to use this method even after they switched to party politics, 
thanks to which they began to open up topics that were later taken over by the 
mainstream parties. For example, both ‘For the City’ and ‘Smart City’ built a 
large part of their election campaign on the topic of empty and unused spaces 
owned by the local municipalities (in their case, the City of Zagreb and the City 
of Split). The two parties advocated for the distribution of the vast spaces in 
public ownership (which was itself a relict of the state-socialist social and 
                                                          
27 Macijewski, Witold. 2002. The Baltic Sea Region: Culture, Politics, Societies. Uppsala: The Baltic 
University Press. 
28 Sloat, Amanda. 2005. The Rebirth of Civil Society The Growth of Women’s NGOs in Central and 
Eastern Europe. European journal of women's studies 12(4), 437-52. 
29 Bernhard, Michael. 1996. Civil Society after the First Transition: Dilemmas of Postcommunist 
Democratization in Poland and Beyond. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 29, 309-30. 
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economic structure) to the local entrepreneurs (the making of the so-called 
entrepreneurial incubators), organizations and craftsmen, as a way of fostering 
local production capacities and social economy.30 In contrast to mainstream 
politicians, civic activists have been held in high regard regardless of their 
respective political backgrounds for their proactive attitudes in putting new 
topics on the political agenda. 
 
Proactive attitudes were crucially associated with another important 
characteristic of the CSO: its adaptability to different circumstances. Due to 
intensive communication with citizens, largely enabled by the usage of social 
media and other contemporary communication technologies, the civil society in 
Croatia has been characterized by timely reactions to current issues. Closely 
related to the previous pattern, this was achieved by focusing on the small-
scale issues relevant to ordinary people. This feature was especially present in 
almost all of the analysed parties. Unlike mainstream political parties, which 
remained focused on ideological left-right divides that largely corresponded 
with historical, political and ethnic divides, the topics addressed by the CSOs 
appeared to be more understandable to the average voter, whether this 
concerned the construction of a school in a remote city neighbourhood in the 
case of ‘Smart City’ or the protection of the urban landscape in the case of ‘Srđ 
is Ours.’  
 
Finally, citizen mobilization is key for successful CSO campaigns. In contrast to 
mainstream political parties, which could easily survive the elections by 
counting on a steady base of loyal party voters, the CSOs typically needed 
broad citizen support. This allowed them to lead battles with the government 
officials on equal footing. In order to achieve this, the CSOs were forced to stay 
more open to the broader public than mainstream political parties, and to 
create a sense of community ownership over the corresponding sets of ideas 
and the means of their implementation. As a consequence, the notion of a 
common challenge created solidarity among their members, which led to the 
feeling of commitment in conducting a collective action.31 This was not 
necessarily only in the field of social movements, as proposed by Tarrow, but 
also in civil society in general.  
 
Civil society is according to Putnam’s idea32 a factory of social capital. However, 
besides the macro level of analysis – a sum of micro social relations that are 
beneficial for democracy at large, as opposed to the societies where one ‘bowls 
alone’ – this notion can also be easily interpreted on the micro level of social 
analysis. Through engagement in civil society, activists learn social skills and 
the sense of community management necessary for mobilizing broader groups 
of people. This can be seen in the experiences of the activists from the five 
analysed parties. Even though a great majority of the activists involved in the 
                                                          
30 However, despite the relative simplicity of the implementation of this project, the mainstream 
parties, in this case the Social Democratic Party of Croatia in power throughout the previous 
decade, took over the idea and introduced it into their electoral platform. 
31 Tarrow Sidney. 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
32 Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press; Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of 
American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
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parties had little or no political experience, their CSO background provided 
them with positive predispositions for coping with their most serious challenge: 
how to gather disappointed voters and convince them to trust them. At the 
same time, thanks to their involvement in grassroots initiatives – including 
acquaintanceships and friendships obtained during years spent working, 
talking and meeting with members of their community – some of the parties we 
analyse had a head start.  
 
Years of unsuccessful dialogue between politicians and civil society, which in 
the previous section we presented with the example of the social movement 
‘Right to the City,’ surely played an important role in the transformation of 
CSOs into political parties. The protests, where more than 130 peaceful 
protesters were arrested, must have left great doubt and a deep impression on 
many Croatian activists, even if the impact of the RTC has been less 
immediate. In this sense, the disappointment of the civil activists with the 
government’s lack of response provided a link between the macro level (crisis of 
democracy, low degree of trust in political parties, high level of trust in CSOs) 
and micro level of analysis (the motivation of the actors). However, in this 
section we turned to the additional features that allowed the CSO actors to 
take over this role, rounding up the scheme of the opportunity structure,33 
which created a new social and political landscape. In the following paragraphs 
we move to the concluding remarks.  
 
 
Conclusion 
The concept of active citizenship is in many ways crucial for the principles of 
civil society. Conscientious citizens seeking to express their social and political 
beliefs, and thereby to work on solving problems in their community, typically 
tend to assemble in formal or informal groups with the aim to be heard and 
represented. Such non-state organizations represent an inevitable part of 
democratic societies worldwide, whose political spheres, in a narrow meaning, 
are supplemented by all kinds of civil society initiatives. They thereby fulfil the 
‘watchdog’ function. However, according to Rosanvallon’s theory described in 
the theoretical framework, the counter-democratic reform is to be achieved 
precisely by (re-)introducing properties that are traditionally associated with 
civil society to the political field, in a narrower sense. How is this to be 
accomplished? In order to present one empirical possibility of such a proposal, 
we have in this paper focused on the recent trends in Croatian local politics.  
 
In our analysis, we described new political initiatives that advocate closer 
contact with their constituencies and two-way communication with the voters. 
This enabled them to endorse the wishes and needs of the citizens, all of whom, 
to a greater or lesser extent, originated from CSOs. Transition from civil 
society to formal politics is surely not an entirely uncontroversial step. Civil 
society organizations are by definition supposed to be non-governmental and 
apolitical. They are part of a sector that seeks to promote its ideas as a partner 
of the democratically elected government. Direct political engagement – and 
this is only one part of the problem – brings risk to the very same goals that 
were meant to be achieved. Indeed, for Croatian CSOs, it took years of broken 
                                                          
33 Tarrow, Power, 85. 
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promises and being ignored by the authorities before they decided to act. 
However, in the case of the participatory democratic parties analysed in this 
paper, there was a move to formal politics. What has led to this? Why did the 
CSO actors decide to enter a new field of political action that, in several 
respects (habitus, political perspective), is quite opposite from the type of action 
that they were used to in their previous careers?  
 
The crisis of democracy presented the usual suspects. According to this 
hypothesis, low levels of trust in the political parties and high support for the 
civil sector motivated the CSOs to engage in party politics. However, an 
additional trigger was needed. In this paper, we described how this process 
took place. We demonstrated how disappointment with the non-transparency of 
policy-making, suspicious priorities on the political agenda and simply not 
being taken seriously caused these actors to considered their further actions in 
the CSO sector unfeasible. They instead decided to enter the political arena. At 
the same time, besides the aspect of motivation, we addressed three additional 
properties – proactivity, adaptability and the mobilization capacity – 
demonstrating how the organizational culture of the Croatian CSOs proved 
important for shaping this political movement. Rather than leading to a 
solution, we argue that the crisis of political legitimacy merely opened an 
empty space that was filled by the actors with the best strategic positions. As a 
result, the arena of formal politics was penetrated by a new sort of political 
actor with an explicit aim to participate in the political game. Instead of being 
a mere stakeholder in the policy-making process, this new actor’s goal was to 
govern. This established a new mode of political activity in Croatian politics 
based on the participatory democracy modus operandi.  
 
Apart from being a relatively recent phenomenon, the parties discussed in this 
research still do not represent key players on the Croatian political scene. At 
this moment in time, we cannot know if they will continue to grow and achieve 
better results in the next elections, or if they will stagnate and perhaps fall 
apart. Perhaps the five parties will merge, creating a strong alternative for the 
national level. Alternatively, the trend will remain polycentric, with a further 
proliferation of parties with a similar profile. Furthermore, we cannot be sure if 
similar trends will appear in political contexts similar to the Croatian one. Will 
other countries from CEE follow these footsteps or will this remain a lonely 
trend? The sequel of this story indeed remains to be seen. However, in this 
paper we have demonstrated a trend that, despite the focus on one single 
country case, can serve to provide an interesting comparative perspective for 
any future improvements in democracy. This holds especially true in the aspect 
of participatory reforms of political parties, which still represent the main tool 
of representative democracy. Even if the “golden era” of civil society in CEE is 
indeed behind us,34 this case brings forth innovative ways in which civil society 
continues to play a progressive role in the development of post-socialist 
societies after several decades of democratic transformations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 Merkel, Plausible Theory.  
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